The impact of maximum markup regulation on prices by Genakos, Christos et al.
1 
The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices1 
 
Christos Genakos2, Pantelis Koutroumpis3, and Mario Pagliero4 
February 2016 
 
 
Abstract 
Markup regulation is a common yet understudied type of regulation. We analyze the repeal of 
maximum wholesale and retail markup regulation in an oligopolistic and vertically nonintegrated 
market. By comparing the prices of products affected by regulation before and after the policy 
change and using unregulated products as a control group, we find that abolishing regulation led 
to a significant decrease in both retail and wholesale prices. The results provide indirect but 
consistent evidence that markup ceilings provided a focal point for collusion among wholesalers. 
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1. Introduction 
State imposed markups are common across markets. According to the World Health Organization, 
around 60% of low- and middle-income countries regulate wholesale or retail maximum markups in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Ball 2011, World Health Organization 2013). In high-income countries, 
maximum markups are also commonly imposed for prescription and over-the-counter drugs.5 Markup 
regulation has been used in the US market for alcoholic beverages and in the Canadian and European 
gasoline markets.6 In about 12 percent of the world gas market, prices are regulated using cost plus 
rules7, which often prescribe regulated markups on production or import costs.8 Extensive markup 
regulations have been used in the fruit and vegetable markets in Greece and are under review in Israel.9 
Yet despite this wide application, the effects of markup regulation have never been subject to systematic 
empirical testing.  
Governments typically justify imposing maximum markups on the grounds of protecting consumers 
from the effects of excessive market power. In oligopolistic markets, the main argument in favor of 
maximum markups is to trim the right tail of the markup distribution, hence limiting the most extreme 
instances of exploitation of market power, in which the price exceeds by far the marginal cost. This is 
expected to put downward pressure on retail prices, without affecting firms with smaller markups (e.g., a 
competitive fringe). If binding, markup ceilings will force some firms to reduce prices. If not binding, 
prices will not be affected. Hence, the average price is expected to fall.  
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 In nearly all EU member states, pharmacists’ fees or margins on the sales of drugs are regulated (see Philipsen, 
2013, for an overview and Schaumans and Verboven, 2008, for a study of entry in the Belgian market for 
pharmacies). 
6
 Different types of markup regulation (often in conjunction with other types of regulation) have been used in the US 
market for alcoholic beverages (Seim and Waldfogel, 2013; Miravete, et al., 2014), in the Canadian and European 
gasoline markets (Sen et al. 2011; Suvankulov et al. 2012; Haucap and Müller 2012) and in the liberalized European 
telecom sector (Peitz, 2003). Finally, the American Defense Commissary Agency supplies groceries to military 
personnel and veterans at regulated prices, which are determined using a markup rule (Defense Commissary 
Agency, 2012). 
7
 International Gas Union (2014). 
8
 For example, gas prices in China at different stages of the production and transportation process are set by adding 
regulated margins to production costs. This generates significant local price differences (Corbeau et al., 2012). 
9
 Consumers and producers seem to be advocating the introduction of maximum wholesale markups in the market 
for fruits and vegetables. Regulations are under consideration in parliament (Israel Consumer Council, 2015). 
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Surprisingly, there is no evidence on the actual impact of markup regulation on prices. Moreover, 
existing studies on the impact of price regulation challenge this seemingly uncontroversial prediction. 
Knittel and Stango (2003) show that mandatory price ceilings in the credit card market had the 
unexpected effect of increasing average prices by providing a focal point for collusion to unconstrained 
firms (Schelling 1960).10 In principle, maximum markup regulation may also have this perverse effect. 
Still, the evidence on price regulation does not imply that markup regulation will have similar effects, 
and the impact of markup regulation on prices remains an open issue.11  
In this paper, we estimate the impact of maximum markup regulation on retail and wholesale prices in 
an oligopolistic and vertically nonintegrated market. We take advantage of the repeal of maximum 
markup regulation in the Greek market for fresh fruits and vegetables. First implemented right after the 
Second World War, markup regulation was hastily canceled in June 2011 with the objective of reducing 
unnecessary regulation in the Greek economy. 
Regulation consisted of maximum wholesale and retail markups on virtually all fruits and vegetables, 
whether imported or locally produced. Nonetheless, five products - apples, lemons, mandarins, oranges, 
and pears - were exempted from regulation. To identify the impact of deregulation on prices, we compare 
prices of products affected by regulation before and after the policy change and use the unregulated 
products as a control group. After accounting for product and store characteristics, time trends and yearly 
price cycles (typical of fruit and vegetable products), deregulation provides some plausibly exogenous 
variation that allows us to estimate the causal impact of regulation.  
Our dataset consists of three types of data. First, it includes weekly store-level retail prices for each 
fruit and vegetable product category both from supermarkets and street markets in Athens. Our sample 
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 Albæk, Møllgaard, and Overgaard (1997) also show that price regulation may favor collusion. In their case, firms 
benefited from the availability of price information rather than from the existence of a focal point. The literature on 
price regulation has mainly focused on other issues, such as rationing and the welfare effects of binding price 
regulation (Olsen, 1972; Smith and Phelps, 1978; Raymon, 1983; French and Lee, 1987; Deacon and Sonstelie, 
1989; Deacon and Sonstelie, 1991; Suen, 1989; Davis and Kilian, 2011). There is no evidence on the actual impact 
of markup regulation on prices, product availability, or entry, while there is some recent evidence on the impact of 
price floors on prices and market structure (Carranza, Clark, and Houde, 2013). 
11
 Section 2 compares markup and price regulation in greater detail.  
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covers one and a half years before and after the policy change, from 4 January 2010 to 28 December 
2012. Second, we use median monthly wholesale fruit and vegetable prices from the Athens Central 
Wholesale Market. Third, we collected weekly store-specific retail prices for 19 non-fruit and vegetable 
products sold in supermarkets during the same period. 
The main challenge to the empirical study of markup regulation is that one cannot distinguish between 
constrained and unconstrained firms by observing individual prices, which are not enough to infer 
markups. We overcome this problem by using a difference in difference methodology and studying the 
impact of a specific policy change on the conditional distribution of prices at the retail and wholesale 
level. We find that abolishing markup regulation led to a surprising 6 percent drop in average retail 
prices. This reduction in the average price of fruit and vegetables corresponds to about 1 percent decrease 
in the price of food of a typical Greek household. In aggregate, this decrease implies savings of about 
€256 million per year.  
Wholesale prices also decreased as a consequence of deregulation by about the same amount. As 
expected, the retail and wholesale prices of goods in the control group were not affected by the policy 
change. These results are robust to a number of alternative econometric specifications and different 
methods of selecting the control group. As to whether regulation affected the behavior of wholesalers or 
retailers (or both), we find that, after accounting for wholesale prices, retail prices were not significantly 
affected by changes in regulation. This suggests that although regulation had a direct effect on 
wholesalers, it only indirectly affected retailers, who adjusted their prices to the lower wholesale prices. 
Given that regulation is often instituted in order to protect consumers, it is natural to ask how 
deregulation might actually result in lower prices. We investigate the hypothesis that maximum markups 
may provide a focal point for collusion (Knittel and Stango 2003) and also explore alternative hypotheses 
based on incentives to reduce costs and vertical relations. A number of factors facilitating collusion seem 
to be present in the wholesale market. First, the market operates as a licensed market, with a small and 
stable group of operators. Second, wholesalers operate in close physical proximity and trade 
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homogeneous products (within varieties), making it possible to monitor and share information (Hellenic 
Competition Commission, 2013; henceforth HCC).  
We provide specific empirical evidence consistent with collusion. All of the supermarkets in our 
sample typically buy from wholesalers. In contrast, while smaller retailers in street markets also rely on 
wholesalers for some products, they buy others from a fragmented market of local producers. We find that 
average prices in street markets were less affected by deregulation than those at supermarkets: although 
the retail prices of items sourced from wholesalers fell as much at street markets as in supermarkets, the 
retail prices of locally sourced products were not significantly affected. Our results complement the 
existing literature by providing indirect evidence that markup regulation may also lead to collusion.12  
Our work also relates to empirical studies of markets with vertical relations. Most of the research in 
this area has focused on the effects of vertical agreements (restraints) among firms, whereas our aim is to 
measure the impact of government regulation (Lafontaine and Slade, 2008). From a policy perspective, 
our work also contributes to the existing literature investigating how regulation affects efficiency and 
economic performance (see, for example, Djankov et al. 2002; Scarpetta and Tressel 2002; Blanchard, 
2004; Katsoulacos et al. 2014). Finally, our results inform the debate on recent investigations by the 
European competition authorities (European Competition Network, 2012) into suspected vertical and 
horizontal agreements harming competition in the food market.13 
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 Porter and Zona (1993 and 1999) study procurement auctions by comparing the bids of firms that were likely to 
be part in a collusive agreement and those that were not. Porter (1983), Ellison (1994), and Baldwin et al. (1997), 
instead, use a statistical model to identify collusive behavior from the data. Knittel and Stango (2003) build on this 
approach to distinguish the probability of collusion at the price ceiling from the probability of being constrained by 
the price ceiling. In our setting, it is not possible to observe which sellers are charging the maximum markups. 
Hence, our focus is entirely on policy evaluation. We do not aim at identifying the exact mechanism that links 
regulation to higher prices. Similarly, we do not aim at providing a general methodology to identify collusion in the 
absence of an exogenous policy change. 
13
 A large literature relates to minimum markups, sales-below-cost laws, and predatory pricing (see Motta 2004 for a 
review and Biscourp, Boutin, and Vergè, 2013, for a recent policy evaluation). Although similar in their 
implementation (a constraint on markups), the economic rationale for these laws is different from that of maximum 
markup regulation studied in this paper.  
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2. Markup Regulation and Price Regulation 
Imposing a maximum markup ( − ) ⁄ <  implicitly constrains the price  that a firm can charge, 
given its marginal cost of production	,  < (1 + ). This mechanism is analogous to the way in which 
price ceilings constrain firms with higher prices. However, markup regulation differs from price 
regulation in a number of ways. First, it constrains firms (or products) with higher markups, which are not 
necessarily those with higher prices. Hence, the impact of markup regulation on the distribution of prices 
will generally differ from that of price ceilings. Second, markup regulation limits the benefits from cost 
reductions, while price regulation provides strong incentives to increase efficiency.14 Third, markup 
regulation is used in markets (for example, fruits and vegetables) in which price regulation would be 
impossible to implement due to high seasonality or uncertainty in production costs. Fourth, the 
enforcement of markup regulations is generally more difficult and costly as firms may misreport or distort 
their cost structure in response to regulation. 
In a repeated game framework, collusion on prices can be sustained in equilibrium by the threat of 
future punishments (e.g., a price war), triggered by deviations from the collusive pricing strategy (Knittel 
and Stango 2003; Green and Porter 1984; Rotemberg and Saloner 1986; Abreu et al. 1990; Haltiwanger 
and Harrington 1991). A similar mechanism may lead to collusion on markups, but this requires that 
firms infer the markups of competitors from available data on costs and prices. This makes collusion on 
markups more difficult to sustain in equilibrium than collusion on prices. Hence, the observation that 
price regulation may facilitate collusion does not imply that markup regulation will have the same effect. 
Still, our results complement those of Knittel and Stango (2003) and Albæk, Møllgaard, and Overgaard 
(1997) by providing evidence of a situation in which regulation had the perverse effect of favoring 
collusion. 
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 From this point of view, markup regulation is a relatively low-powered regulation and resembles cost of service 
regulation (Viscusi et al. 2005). The principal-agent problems induced by regulation have been the focus of a large 
literature (Laffont and Tirole 1993). 
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3. The Greek Market for Fruits and Vegetables 
The market for fruits and vegetables in Greece consists of three layers. At the production level, the 
market is very fragmented.15 The wholesale market is significantly more concentrated, with the Athens 
Central Wholesale market operating as a closed market in which only licensed sellers can operate. 
Wholesalers mainly sell to retailers (with supermarkets as their largest customers), but also to street 
market sellers, grocery stores, and restaurants. Finally, at the retail level, consumers buy either from street 
markets (58 percent market share in year 2011 but steadily declining), supermarkets (32 percent market 
share and steadily increasing), and - to a lesser extent - from grocery stores or other corner shops (10 
percent). In street markets, approximately half of the sellers are also producers themselves (HCC, 2013). 
The maximum markup regulation for fruits and vegetables was introduced after World War II as part 
of a broader set of regulations that covered various aspects of retail and wholesale trade, including 
licensing, opening hours and pricing. The regulation initially covered all fruits and vegetables. By 1977, 
however, five products (apples, lemons, mandarins, oranges, and pears) had been exempted from the 
application of maximum markup regulations. No change in the list of excluded products has occurred 
since. The reasoning behind making these exclusions is not clear and the available legal documents and 
other ministerial reports contain no clues. The production, trade, and consumption of these products is 
widespread throughout the country and they are not the output of any specific region or any identifiable 
set of producers. They are statistically indistinguishable from products subject to regulation in terms of 
mean cultivation area, production quantity, and yield.16 
The law provided for product-specific maximum markups ranging between 8 and 12 percent for the 
wholesale market, 20 and 35 percent for supermarkets, and 17 and 32 percent for street markets and 
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 The agricultural sector accounts for 3.1 percent of the Greek GDP and employs 9.2 percent of the total work force, 
which is twice the EU 27 average (4.7 percent). However, the average producer cultivates just 47,000 m2 (11.6 ac) 
vs. the EU average of 126,000 m2 (31.1 ac) Moreover, around 50 percent of the Greek producers own less than 
20,000 m2 (4.9 ac) plots.  
16
 See Table A2 in the Appendix, which uses annual data at the product level from EUROSTAT for 2011. 
Differences remain insignificant if we use other years before 2011 or the average values for the 2006-2011 period. 
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grocery stores (see Table A1 in the Appendix for details).17 The repeal of the maximum markup 
regulation was the outcome of mounting international pressure to liberalize the Greek economy in an 
attempt to limit red tape and government intervention in various markets.18 The policy change was highly 
visible and prominently featured in national newspapers, and the process leading to deregulation was 
quick. The policy was implemented on 23 June 2011, about three weeks after the government first 
announced it.19 
4. Data 
We matched three different data sources for our analysis. First, we obtained weekly store-level retail 
prices for fruits and vegetables in Athens.20 The data was collected through a regular survey run by the 
Greek Ministry for Development and Competitiveness. Prices in supermarkets and street markets were 
recorded on a weekly basis. We obtained store-level data for 36 products, further subdivided into 72 
varieties, from 20 supermarkets and 24 street markets in Athens from 4 January 2010 to 28 December 
2012.21 Second, using a survey administered by the Greek Ministry for Development and 
Competitiveness, we collected information on the retail prices of 19 grocery products other than fruits and 
vegetables sold in the same supermarkets (all product categories and varieties are reported in Table A3 in 
the Appendix). None of these products was affected by the markup regulation. Third, we also obtained 
monthly wholesale median prices of the same fruit and vegetable varieties from the administration of 
Athens Central Wholesale Market during the same period. The wholesale data covers all 36 products and 
59 of the 72 product varieties in the sample of retail prices. 
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 By law, maximum markups are computed over the sum of the purchase price and the transportation cost, before 
adding VAT.  
18
 However, this was not formally part of any agreement between Greece and its creditors (IMF, ECB, EU). 
19
 Ministerial decision A2-1045 (Gazette B’ 1502/22-6-2011). The only other policy that potentially affected both 
regulated and unregulated products during that period were three increases in VAT: from 9% to 10% on 15/3/2010, 
from 10% to 11% on 1/7/2010 and from 11% to 13% on 1/1/2011. 
20
 We focus on Athens, as it is by far the biggest market in Greece, is well-documented in our supermarket sample, 
and provides reliable information on wholesale prices. 
21
 Sellers in street markets were sampled by employees of the Ministry for Development and Competitiveness and 
mean prices in each market were then computed for the same fruit and vegetable varieties as for supermarkets. Our 
sample does not cover grocery stores or other small independent retailers (corner or convenience stores). 
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Figure 1A plots the time series of the weekly average log price of fruit and vegetable products. The 
dashed black line shows products affected by markup regulation; the dashed grey line shows the five 
products not affected by regulation. The average price of products not affected by regulation (the solid 
grey line) is very similar in the period preceding and following the policy change (the vertical red line). 
On the contrary, the average price of products affected by regulation (the solid black line) shows a large 
drop, suggesting a significant reduction in the price of these goods.  
Figure 1A also indicates that fruit and vegetable prices follow a yearly cycle, which is typical of 
agricultural products. To account for products’ yearly cycle, we separately estimate a regression of log 
price on monthly indicator variables for products affected and not affected by regulation. Figure 1B plots 
the weekly average residuals for the two groups of products and compares the period before and after the 
reform.22 In line with the previous figure, there is little change in the average residual for products not 
affected by regulation. However, the average residual for products affected by regulation shows a 
significant drop. In the next sections, we build on these descriptive results and provide a more systematic 
analysis of the possible impact of deregulation. 
5. Identification and Empirical Methodology 
Identification of the impact of the policy change is obtained within a difference in difference 
framework.23 Denote by  the retail price of product variety i, in store j, in week t. The basic empirical 
specification is of the form:  
ln	() =  +  +  + 	x	 +  +                                             (1) 
where  is an indicator variable equal to one after deregulation,  is an indicator variable for 
products affected by the regulation (treatment group), 	x	 denotes their interaction;  is a 
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 The average residual of both series before the reform is normalized to zero. 
23
 Early applications of this approach are found in Ashenfelter and Card (1985), Card (1992), and Card and Krueger 
(1994, 2000).  
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matrix of control variables and  is a random shock with !(|,  , ) = 0.  is the 
crucial parameter capturing the impact of the policy change.  
The key identifying assumption is that price trends would be the same (conditional on covariates ) 
in the treatment and control groups in the absence of treatment. This assumption becomes increasingly 
credible as we progressively add appropriate controls in . First, we control for changes in the VAT 
rates. Second, we include in  eleven month indicator variables, 53 store indicator variables, and 109 
product variety-specific indicator variables. We then add the interaction of month and product fixed 
effects, capturing the yearly price cycle of each product (we assume that varieties of the same product 
follow the same cycle). Finally, we include a quadratic trend (measured in months).24 This captures the 
overall changes in the average price of fruit and vegetable products during the sample period (due, for 
example, to the economic recession).  
The analysis of wholesale prices from the Athens Central Wholesale Market uses the same empirical 
specification with the caveat that only median wholesale prices at a monthly (rather than weekly) 
frequency are available for each product variety.  
6. Empirical Results 
Table 1 reports a simple before-after comparison of the retail price of products covered by regulation 
(treatment group). The average price decreases by 7.7 percent after deregulation (column 1). This 
difference is not much affected when controlling for month (column 2), store, and variety-specific fixed 
effects (column 3). It is also robust to controls for product-specific yearly cycles (column 4). Additionally 
controlling for a linear and a quadratic trend (column 5) leads to slightly smaller estimated difference in 
prices (5.6 percent).  
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 We also estimate the model using flexible period-specific indicator variables (153 week-specific indicator 
variables) instead of a time trend, as in Jin and Leslie (2003). None of our results change in any fundamental way.  
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Table 2 reports our main results. The simple difference in difference estimator, with no additional 
controls, shows that the average price of the treatment group significantly fell by 10 percent (column 1). 
In contrast, prices for the control group were not significantly affected. In columns 2 and 3, the negative 
impact of deregulation survives the inclusion of month, store, and variety-specific fixed effects. After 
controlling for product-specific yearly cycles (column 4) and quadratic trend (column 5), the estimated 
causal impact of deregulation is -6.4 percent.25 
The economic magnitude of the results is significant. A 6 percent decrease in the average price of fruit 
and vegetables corresponds to a 1 percent decrease in the price of food of a typical Greek household, and 
a 0.16 percent decrease in the consumer price index. This, in turn, corresponds to a decrease of €23 in 
expenditure per capita per year, amounting to €256 million per year in aggregate expenditure (about 0.12 
percent of GDP). 
Table 3 reports the results when analyzing the wholesale data alone. A simple before-after comparison 
of the wholesale prices of regulated products indicates that prices fell by 9.9 percent after deregulation 
(column 1). Without additional control variables, the difference in difference estimate of the impact of the 
policy change is higher in column 2. Including month and variety-specific fixed effects, product-specific 
yearly cycles, and the quadratic trend leads to a smaller but statistically significant estimated impact of 
deregulation of -9.5 percent.26  
Selection of the Control Group and Placebo Test 
The difference in difference approach assumes that the policy change does not affect the control group 
(no spillover effects). However, given that both our control and treatment groups consist of fresh fruits 
and vegetables, the policy change could potentially have an indirect impact on the demand for, and hence 
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 The results are not affected if we replace the time trend with week-specific indicator variables.  
26
 Standard errors are larger than in Table 2 but the estimated coefficients are not significantly different from the 
corresponding estimates in Table 2. 
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the prices of, some products in the control group. This could happen if some cross price elasticities 
between products in the two groups were sufficiently high (positive or negative).  
In the absence of a formal randomization into treatment status, the choice of the control group entails a 
tradeoff. Similar products are more likely to meet the equal trends assumption, but they are also more 
likely to be related (substitutes or complements). If this is the case, our estimator will not capture the 
impact of the policy but only the differential impact of the policy on the two groups. Note that both 
Figure 1, where the average prices of the control group are very similar before and after the policy 
change, and the insignificant  coefficient in Table 2 seem to refute this idea.  
Nevertheless, we investigate this possible bias by using a different control group, comprised of 19 
non-fruit and vegetable packaged goods such as rice, spaghetti, flour, and milk (the full list is reported in 
Table A3, column 3). These products are stocked in all supermarkets in our sample and are very unlikely 
to be strong substitutes or complements of the fruit and vegetables in our treatment group. Table 4 
presents the results using the same additional control variables as in Table 2. The impact of deregulation 
ranges between 9 and 12 percent. In the specification with the richest set of controls (column 5), the 
impact of deregulation is about 8.8 percent, slightly larger than in Table 2 but within conventional 
confidence intervals of our previous estimates. As before, there is no systematic impact of deregulation on 
the price of the products in the control group. Overall, the choice of the control group seems not to 
significantly affect our results. 
Since most of the products in the original control group are fruits, in Table 5, column 1, we also 
separately estimate the impact of the policy change for fruits and vegetables. The estimated impact of the 
policy is very similar in magnitude and not statistically different for the two groups. We also test the 
robustness of the common trend assumption in (1) using the period before the change in regulation to 
estimate the impact of a placebo treatment. In Table 5, column 2, we drop the period after 22 April 2011, 
which is two months before the actual policy change, to avoid any possible anticipation effects (which 
will be discussed in Section 6.2). We then choose the midpoint of the remaining period (22 September 
13 
2010) as the date of a fictitious reform. The results show that the fictitious policy has no impact on the 
treatment or the control group.27  
6.1. Interpretation of the Estimated Impact of Deregulation: Markup Regulation and Collusion 
Our results are not consistent with the view that the only effect of regulation is that of constraining 
firms with high markups, hence leading to a decrease in average prices. Unexpectedly, we find that 
average prices decreased with deregulation. Although some firms might have been constrained by the 
markup regulation, another effect must have played a major role. The main candidate explanation is that 
regulation facilitated collusive behavior (we will discuss alternative explanations in Section 6.3). The 
economic intuition underlying this idea is that (unconstrained) firms used the maximum markups as focal 
points for coordination, leading to increases in average prices (Knittel and Stango, 2003). Repeal of the 
law might have destroyed these focal points and led to significant price decreases.  
If collusion is driving the results in Tables 1-5, we will expect to see a larger impact of the policy in 
markets in which collusion is easier to maintain. As discussed earlier, the wholesale market for fruit and 
vegetable products is more concentrated than the retail market, and less affected by entry and exit. Firms 
(in terms of sale volume) are also larger and more likely to be incorporated (HCC, 2013). Moreover, 
wholesalers are physically closer to each other and interact daily. Finally, products (within varieties) are 
homogenous in the wholesale market, while at the retail level there is differentiation due to location, 
availability, and complementary services offered to customers. Hence, collusion is expected to be more 
likely in the wholesale market. 
We test this hypothesis in three ways. First, we investigate the impact of the policy change on retail 
prices holding wholesale prices constant. We merged the retail with the wholesale price data, excluding 
the varieties not included in the wholesale data set. Table 5, column 3 reports the results from our 
benchmark specification controlling for store, variety-specific fixed effects, product specific yearly cycles 
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 There is no change in the list of available products or varieties before or after deregulation in the retail or 
wholesale dataset. Deregulation did not seem to have any effect on product availability or product variety. 
14 
and quadratic trend on this slightly modified dataset. Not surprisingly, the impact of the policy (-5.5 
percent) is very similar to what we found in Table 2, column 5 (-6.4 percent). In Table 5, column 4 we 
additionally control for wholesale prices, and the effect of the policy change becomes statistically 
insignificant. Deregulation affected retail prices indirectly through wholesale prices, but there is no 
evidence of a direct effect of deregulation on retail prices.28 
Second, we estimate the differential effect of the change in regulation in supermarkets and street 
markets. This is because supermarkets typically buy all of their grocery products from wholesalers (HCC, 
2013). Street vendors, on the other hand, have access to a variety of small producers or are producers 
themselves. Hence, collusion at the wholesale level is likely to impact prices in supermarkets more than in 
street markets. In Table 5, column 5 we find that the policy change indeed had a large and significant 
impact (-10 percent) on supermarkets, whereas street markets were relatively unaffected. 
Our third approach focuses on the differential impact of the policy on specific products sold at street 
markets, since even street vendors have to rely on wholesalers for their supply of some specific products. 
Unfortunately, the classification of products along this dimension is very difficult. Still, the HCC report 
(2013) shows that street vendors almost never buy lettuce from wholesalers, while they rely on them 
heavily for peaches. Hence, we can test if the policy had a different impact on the price of these two 
products in street markets.  
Table 6, column 1 reports the results of our benchmark specification using the same control group as 
before but including only lettuce (classified as “low”) and peaches (“high”) in the treatment group. The 
impact of the policy is very similar, although standard errors are larger, due to the smaller sample. 
Column 2 confirms our previous findings on the differential effect in supermarkets and street markets. 
Column 3 shows that in street markets, deregulation had no significant impact on the price of lettuce 
(Lowi × Street marketj) but had a negative impact on the price of peaches (Highi × Street marketj). By 
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 The coefficient of the wholesale price in this regression is expected to be positive, since increases in wholesale 
price lead to increases in marginal cost for the retailers. 
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contrast, in supermarkets, both lettuces and peaches were affected by the policy. These new results are 
consistent with markup regulation affecting wholesale prices first, and only indirectly affecting retail 
prices.  
The interpretation of the results based on collusion requires that wholesalers could monitor the 
strategies of their competitors. It is difficult to evaluate what wholesalers knew about their competitors’ 
costs and prices, although monitoring seems to have been possible for three main reasons. First, the 
identity of (large) customers supplied by each wholesaler could easily be observed because of the 
physical arrangement of the Athens Central Wholesale Market. Second, wholesale transactions were far 
from confidential, although they were subject to negotiation between wholesalers and (large) buyers.29 
Finally, information on retail prices in supermarkets was widely available to competitors.  
The Impact of the Level of Regulated Markups 
According to the collusion hypothesis, collusion should be more difficult to maintain as the gains from 
deviating from collusive behavior increase. Knittel and Stango (2003) show that cheating may become 
more attractive when the focal point is higher, since profits from cheating rise faster than profits from 
cooperation. They also provide evidence that higher price ceilings in the credit card market made 
collusion more difficult to sustain.  
We categorize products into two groups based on the level of the maximum wholesale markup (low 
maximum markup, including products with maximum markup at 8 and 10 percent, and high maximum 
markups, including products with 12 percent maximum markup, see Table A1). In Table 7, column 1 we 
report the estimated impact of deregulation on the wholesale price obtained interacting 	x	 
with an indicator variable for each group. We find that the effect of deregulation was stronger for 
products with low maximum markups than for products with high maximum markups. These results are 
                                                          
29
 Each wholesaler had to report wholesale prices to the market authorities (for each transaction). Given the physical 
proximity of wholesalers, this information could easily be shared with other wholesalers. There is no evidence of 
systematic use of rebates that would generate a difference between the reported wholesale price and the price 
actually paid by retailers.  
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consistent with the collusion hypothesis and the existing literature. Still, they should be interpreted with 
caution, since we estimate the differential impact of deregulation on average prices, not directly on the 
probability of collusion. 
Maximum markups are correlated across markets. The correlation coefficient between the maximum 
markups for wholesalers and supermarkets is 0.33, between those for supermarkets and street markets is 
0.99. In column 2, we replicate column 1 for retail prices in supermarkets, splitting products into two 
categories based on their maximum markups in the retail market. We find no significant difference 
between the two groups in the impact of the policy change. Interestingly, when we classify products 
according to the level of the maximum markup in the wholesale market (column 3), we find that retail 
prices fell more for products with low maximum markups. Only differences in maximum markups at the 
wholesale level generate differences across products in the impact of the policy change. These results are 
consistent with previous evidence suggesting that collusion was taking place in the wholesale market and 
not in the retail market. 
The Impact on the Distribution of Prices and Quantile Regressions 
While the previous sections focused on the impact of deregulation on the mean, we now investigate how 
deregulation affected the entire price distribution. Figure 2 plots the distribution of the logarithm of prices 
for products in the treatment group for one year before and after deregulation. After deregulation, the 
distribution shifts to the left and becomes more dispersed. In particular, the mean and the median 
decrease, together with the 1st and 5th percentiles, whereas the 95th and 99th percentiles slightly increase.  
A similar pattern emerges from the distribution of residuals from a regression of retail prices on product, 
store, product-month interactions, and a quadratic time trend (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). In Table 8, 
we use quantile regressions to measure the impact of markup regulation on the distribution of residuals. 
Deregulation affected the left more than the right tail of the distribution. Overall, the magnitude of the 
impact of deregulation is consistent with the impact on the mean measured in Table 2, column 5.  
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The effect of deregulation on the distribution of prices is consistent with the collusion hypothesis. 
However, this hypothesis implies that regulation leads to a more concentrated markup distribution, but 
does not necessarily imply a more concentrated price distribution, as marginal costs (purchase price plus 
transportation costs) vary across firms. Only if there is a positive correlation between the level of prices 
and markups will markup regulation lead to less price dispersion. While a positive correlation between 
prices and markups seems plausible at the product level, we cannot directly test this with our data.30  
Dynamic effects 
Finally, we estimate a dynamic model interacting % with indicator variables for 10 two-week periods 
before and after the policy change, 
ln	() =  +  +  + ,&'( 	x		)&'* + ,&'+(	x		)&'+* + ⋯+
,&-+( 	x		)&-+* + ,&-(	x		)&-* +  +                                                           (2) 
where )&' = 1 in the ith period before deregulation.31 The last period (T+10) includes all the 
observations 20 or more weeks after the policy change.32 
Figure A2 in the Appendix plots the regression coefficients together with their 95% confidence interval.33 
Deregulation has no effect on prices until four weeks before the actual implementation.34 There seems to 
be some anticipation effect about four weeks before the policy change, as indicated by the drop in the 
estimated coefficient in T-2. This corresponds to government announcement concerning the impending 
change in regulation. Point estimates are negative and stable from that point on, and their magnitude is in 
                                                          
30
 There is a growing empirical literature on the impact of collusion and cartels on price variability (see, for 
example, Abrantes-Metz, et al., 2006, and Botolova, et al., 2008). 
31
 The results are robust with respect to the choice of the window around the policy change. 
32
 The omitted indicator variable covers the period 20 or more weeks before deregulation. See, Autor (2003) or 
Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) for a discussion of this approach. 
33
 Estimated coefficients are reported in Table A4 of the Appendix. 
34
 The null hypothesis that all coefficients for periods before the deregulation are equal to zero is not rejected at 
conventional levels (p-value = 0.939).  
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line with our previous estimates of the impact of deregulation (Figure A2 also reports the estimated 
treatment effect from Table 2, column 4).35 
6.2. Alternative Hypotheses and Interpretations of the Results 
Markup Regulation and Cost Inflation  
A binding markup regulation limits the benefits from cost reductions, as investments that reduce marginal 
cost result in a reduction in the maximum price that a firm can charge. For example, a retailer may not 
benefit from exerting effort in trying to buy at the lowest price, or in minimizing transportation costs, 
since lower costs are reflected in a lower maximum price. Hence, in principle, firms may distort their cost 
structure in response to regulation.  
Leaving aside the possibility of collusion, the introduction of a binding markup regulation has, in theory, 
two effects. First, it directly reduces prices for a given marginal cost. Second, it may lead to inefficiencies 
and higher marginal costs, which results in higher prices. However, the incentives to inflate costs only 
partially offset the direct impact of regulation.36 Hence, markup regulation is expected to lead to lower 
prices, which clearly contradicts the empirical evidence. 
Moreover, the cost inflation hypothesis implies that constrained firms drive the higher average prices 
during the regulation period. If there is a positive correlation between the level of prices and markups, 
then the impact of regulation will be concentrated in the right tail of the price distribution. However, 
Figure 2 and the results on the quantile regressions suggest a larger impact of the policy in the left tail of 
the price distribution, where unconstrained firms are more likely to operate.  
                                                          
35
 The coefficients are imprecisely estimated, as fruit and vegetable prices show considerable weekly variability in 
addition to their yearly cycle. The estimates of the dynamic impact of the reform on wholesale prices are also very 
noisy. Figure A3 and Table A5 in the Appendix describe the regression coefficients. The null hypothesis that all 
coefficients for periods before the deregulation are equal to zero is not rejected at conventional levels (p-value = 
0.454). 
36
 Consider the introduction of a binding maximum markup regulation. Regulation makes profit proportional to 
revenues, but a price that maximizes revenues is strictly lower than the profit maximizing price (for any positive 
marginal costs). Hence, even if the firm can manipulate its marginal cost, the second effect of markup regulation 
will never fully offset the first. The argument is described in detail in Appendix B. 
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Markup Regulation and Vertical Relations 
The introduction of a binding markup regulation at the retail level can affect the incentives of an upstream 
wholesaler. However, theoretical arguments suggest that the wholesaler will never charge a higher 
wholesale price in response to the introduction of markup regulation downstream.37 This implies that the 
higher prices observed in the fruits and vegetable market before the reform are unlikely to be caused by 
vertical relations along the supply chain.38 
Weak or Imperfect Law Enforcement 
The specific nature of the regulation we are studying required extensive monitoring by the regulator. 
How could weak or imperfect law enforcement affect the interpretation of the results? Evidence from the 
HCC (2013) report suggests that the law was well enforced in supermarkets. We do not have direct 
evidence on the quality of enforcement in street and wholesale markets. In any case, our analysis does not 
rest on any assumption on the quality of enforcement. Lack of enforcement would imply that regulation 
was less effective (or perhaps even completely ineffective) in constraining prices. We would then expect 
no impact of deregulation, whereas we find a significant effect. However, even if not binding or poorly 
enforced, regulation might have provided a focal point for collusion. 
7. Concluding Remarks  
In this paper, we present the first systematic evidence of the impact of maximum markup regulation on 
retail and wholesale prices. Our results show that repeal of regulation led to significant price decreases, 
corresponding to an estimated €256 million yearly decrease in consumer expenditure. We also provide 
indirect but consistent evidence that the most likely explanation for this phenomenon was collusion at the 
wholesale level. First, several features (centralized physical arrangement, barriers to entry, limited 
                                                          
37
 In the classic vertical relations game (Spengler 1950; Tirole 1988), the introduction of a maximum markup 
regulation downstream cannot lead to higher wholesale prices upstream. Appendix B illustrates this result in more 
detail. 
38
 Also this second alternative explanation is based on the idea that constrained retailers drive the increase in average 
price during the regulation period. Hence, one would again expect a larger impact of deregulation in the right tail of 
the distribution of prices, which is not observed in the data. 
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number of large competitors, daily interaction) of the wholesale market make it more susceptible to 
collusion. Second, the negative impact of deregulation on retail prices is driven by price changes at the 
wholesale level. Third, prices in supermarkets, which mainly buy from wholesalers, experienced the most 
significant changes, whereas prices in the street markets decreased significantly only for products that 
passed through the wholesale channel.  
The existing data do not allow us to investigate the exact mechanism possibly used to sustain 
collusion, nor to assess whether explicit or tacit collusion is more likely to have taken place (although this 
distinction is clearly important for competition policy). Overall, the results of our ex-post policy 
evaluation highlight the unexpected consequences of a common yet understudied type of regulation. 
While maximum markup regulation may well serve its intended purpose in some markets, our results 
show that this cannot be taken for granted.  
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 Appendix 2 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
Markup Regulation and Cost Inflation  
Consider the standard monopoly pricing problem, denoting as c>0 the marginal cost and D(p) the demand 
function, with )’ < 0, )’’ ≤ 0. The monopoly price is obtained with the inverse elastic rule, 01'201 = 1/4, 
where 4 = − 56015 . At the optimum, the absolute value of the elasticity of demand 4	is larger than 1. The 
monopoly profits are decreasing in the marginal cost, hence the firm benefits from increases in efficiency.  
Consider now the introduction of a binding markup regulation, where  is the maximum markup, so that 
the regulated price is (1 + ). In this case, the benefits from increases in efficiency are less clear-cut, 
since the profit function is Π = (1 + ))9(1 + ): − )9(1 + ):, which can be rewritten as 
Π = )9(1 + ):.	Increasing c increases the regulated price and the absolute profit margin for each 
unit, while also decreasing demand. Hence, the monopolist may in principle benefit from optimally 
choosing c. However, the first order condition with respect to c implies that ∗(1 + ) = − 592∗(-<):5692∗(-<):. 
This implies that, at the optimum, the elasticity of demand 4	is equal to 1. Hence, the price of a regulated 
monopolist cannot be higher than the standard monopoly price.  
Markup Regulation and Vertical Relations 
Consider the standard vertical relations model (Spengler, 1950; Tirole, 1988) in which an upstream 
wholesaler sells to a downstream retailer (stage 1), who then sells to final consumers (stage 2). For 
simplicity, the demand function is linear, )() = 1 − =, where p denotes the retail price. The marginal 
cost of production is denoted by c and the wholesale price by >. The retailer maximizes ( − >))() 
at a price ∗(>) that solves ∗(>) = > − 5(0)56(0). The wholesaler maximizes (> − ))9∗(>): at a 
wholesale price >∗  that solves  
 >∗ =  − 5(0)56(0) ?@∗?@A.  
Substituting, the equilibrium retail price is given by  
∗ =  − 5(0)56(0)B1 + ?@∗?@AC,  where  
D0∗
D0A = 'E(@)E66(@)(E6(@)*F .  
Using the linearity of the demand function, we can obtain simple expressions for the equilibrium prices, 
∗ = 2G+ GH	and >∗ = 2 + H.  
After the introduction of a binding markup regulation, the retail price is constrained by the regulation. The 
wholesaler maximizes (> − ))9>(1 + ): at a wholesale price >,I∗  that solves  
>,I∗ =  − 5J0A,K∗ (-<)L56J0A,K∗ (-<)L(-<).  
The retail price is then ∗ = >,I∗ (1 + ).	Since demand is linear, we can solve for I∗ = 2(-<) + H	and 
>,I∗ = 2+ H(-<). In equilibrium, the wholesale price with regulation >,I∗  is lower than the wholesale 
price without regulation >∗ 	for any c. Figure B1 describes the retail prices I∗ and ∗ with and without 
regulation; I∗ is smaller than ∗ if  < (-<)H. However, this condition is always met when the markup 
regulation is binding, since ∗ − (1 + )>∗ > 0 implies that  < '<(-<)H. Hence, in equilibrium, the 
retail price is also lower after the implementation of a binding markup regulation.  
  
  
Figure B1: The equilibrium retail price with and without markup regulation. 
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FIGURE 1A: AVERAGE RETAIL PRICES OF REGULATED (TREATMENT) AND UNREGULATED PRODUCTS (CONTROL)
FIGURE 1B: AVERAGE RESIDUALS OF REGRESSIONS OF LOG PRICE ON MONTHLY DUMMIES FOR  REGULATED 
(TREATMENT) AND UNREGULATED PRODUCTS (CONTROL)
Notes: The figure reports the weekly average of the logarithm of products' prices affected by the markup regulation (treatment group, black dashed line) and not affected by regulation
(control group, grey dashed line) and their averages (black solid line for the treatment group and grey solid line for the control group) before and after deregulation.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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Notes: The figure plots the weekly average residual of a regression of log price on monthly indicator variables run separately for products affected by the markup regulation (treatment
group, black dashed line) and not affected by regulation (control group, grey dashed line) and their averages (black solid line for the treatment group and grey solid line for the control
group) after the deregulation. The average residual of both series before the reform is normalized to zero.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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FIGURE 2: THE DISTRIBUTION OF RETAIL PRICES BEFORE AND AFTER DEREGULATION      
(TREATMENT GROUP)
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of log prices of products in the treatment group one year before ("Before") and one year after ("After") the policy change.
Sample statistics are reported in the top left corner.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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Mean 0.246 0.185
Variance 0.288 0.349
1% -1.050 -1.204
5% -0.716 -0.808
10% -0.483 -0.654
25% -0.062 -0.223
50% 0.271 0.239
75% 0.588 0.560
90% 0.916 0.916
95% 1.123 1.163
99% 1.386 1.459
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt
Postt -0.077*** -0.061** -0.067*** -0.075*** -0.056**
dummy=1 after 22 June 2011 (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Observations 44,606 44,606 44,606 44,606 44,606
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.008 0.808 0.867 0.868
Clusters 56 56 56 56 56
Month FE yes yes
Store FE yes yes yes
Product variety FE yes yes yes
Month × Product FE yes yes
Year-month trend and square yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS FE FE FE
Dependent variable ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt
Treati × Postt -0.101** -0.100** -0.096*** -0.064*** -0.064***
(0.045) (0.044) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023)
Postt 0.024 0.033 0.015 -0.015 0.005
dummy=1 after 22 June 2011 (0.036) (0.035) (0.025) (0.020) (0.021)
Treati 0.028 0.025
(0.117) (0.117)
Observations 56,523 56,523 56,523 56,523 56,523
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.009 0.789 0.858 0.859
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72
Month FE yes yes
Store FE yes yes yes
Product variety FE yes yes yes
Month × Product FE yes yes
Year-month trend and square yes
TABLE 1 - THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON RETAIL PRICES (TREATMENT ONLY)
TABLE 2 - THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON RETAIL PRICES (CONTROL AND TREATMENT)
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the retail price of product variety i, in store j, and week t. All regressions include binary indicators for the changes in VAT
rates. Standard errors clustered at the product variety level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
.
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the retail price of product variety i, in store j, and week t. All regressions include binary indicators for the changes in VAT 
rates. Standard errors clustered at the product variety level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE
Dependent variable ln(Wholesale Price)it ln(Wholesale Price)it ln(Wholesale Price)it ln(Wholesale Price)it ln(Wholesale Price)it ln(Wholesale Price)it
Sample Treatment only Control & Treatment Control & Treatment Control & Treatment Control & Treatment Control & Treatment
Treati × Postt -0.156** -0.156** -0.244*** -0.093** -0.095**
(0.072) (0.072) (0.049) (0.040) (0.041)
Postt -0.099** 0.056 -0.022 0.052 -0.074* -0.077
dummy=1 after 22 June 2011 (0.041) (0.059) (0.063) (0.052) (0.043) (0.055)
Treati -0.021 -0.026
(0.148) (0.149)
Observations 880 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.012 0.028 0.787 0.910 0.911
Clusters 45 59 59 59 59 59
Month FE yes yes
Product FE yes yes yes
Month × Product FE yes yes
Year-month trend and square yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS OLS FE FE FE
Dependent variable ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt
Treati × Postt -0.089*** -0.089** -0.120*** -0.087*** -0.088***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Postt 0.012 0.010 0.041** 0.016 0.026
dummy=1 after 22 June 2011 (0.026) (0.033) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018)
Treati -0.546** -0.548**
(0.254) (0.255)
Observations 65,753 65,753 65,753 65,753 65,753
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.119 0.931 0.954 0.954
Clusters 75 75 75 75 75
Month FE yes yes
Store FE yes yes yes
Product variety FE yes yes yes
Month × Product FE yes yes
Year-month trend and square yes
TABLE 3 - THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON WHOLESALE PRICES
TABLE 4 - THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON RETAIL PRICES (ALTERNATIVE CONTROL GROUP)
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the wholesale price of product variety i in month t. All regressions include binary indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Standard errors clustered at the
product variety level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the retail price of product variety i, in store j, and week t. The control group comprises of products sold in supermarkets and shown 
in column 3 of Table A3. All regressions include binary indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Standard errors clustered at the product variety level are reported in parenthesis 
below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt
Sample Control & Treatment Placebo Merged Retail & Wholesale data
Merged Retail & 
Wholesale data
Merged Retail & 
Wholesale data
Treati × Postt 0.027 -0.055** -0.020
(0.024) (0.027) (0.013)
Treati × Postt × Fruitj -0.070*
(0.036)
Treati × Postt × Vegetablej -0.063***
(0.023)
Treati × Postt × Street marketj -0.027
(0.026)
Treati × Postt × Super marketj -0.102***
(0.038)
ln(Wholesale Price)it 0.526***
(0.024)
Postt 0.004 -0.014 -0.010 0.027* -0.016
dummy=1 after 22 June 2011 (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024)
Observations 56,523 23,091 43,159 43,159 43,159
Adjusted R2 0.858 0.805 0.866 0.887 0.867
Clusters 72 71 59 59 59
Store FE yes yes yes yes yes
Product variety FE yes yes yes yes yes
Month × Product FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year-month trend and square yes yes yes yes yes
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method FE FE FE
Dependent variable ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt
Treati × Postt -0.113***
(0.030)
Treati × Postt × Street marketj -0.032
(0.042)
Treati × Postt × Super marketj -0.245***
(0.032)
Treati × Postt × Lowi × Super marketj -0.250***
(0.031)
Treati × Postt × Highi × Super marketj -0.238***
(0.036)
Treati × Postt × Lowi × Street marketj 0.006
(0.018)
Treati × Postt × Highi × Street marketj -0.136***
(0.021)
Postt -0.013 -0.017 -0.003
dummy=1 after 22 June 2011 (0.033) (0.034) (0.038)
Observations 14,075 14,075 14,075
Adjusted R2 0.876 0.879 0.880
Clusters 19 19 19
Store FE yes yes yes
Product variety FE yes yes yes
Month FE yes yes yes
Year-month trend and square yes yes yes
TABLE 5 - THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON RETAIL PRICES (ROBUSTNESS)
TABLE 6 - THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON RETAIL PRICES (SELECTED PRODUCTS)
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the retail price of product variety i, in store j, and week t. In column 2, the sample includes only observations before 22 April 2011. In columns 3-5, the sample
includes only products for which data on wholesale prices is available. All regressions include binary indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Standard errors clustered at the product variety level are reported in
parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the retail price of product variety i, in store j, and week t. The sample includes all the products 
assigned to the control group  (see Table A1) but only lettuces ("Low") and peaches ("High") in the tretment group. All regressions include binary 
indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Standard errors clustered at the product variety level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method FE FE FE
Dependent variable ln(Wholesale Price)it ln(Retail Price)ijt ln(Retail Price)ijt
Treati × Postt × Low markup regulationj -0.147*** -0.086**
Wholesale markup regulation ≤ 10% (0.047) (0.036)
Treati × Postt × High markup regulationj -0.063 -0.044
Wholesale markup regulation > 10% (0.043) (0.028)
Treati × Postt × Low markup regulationj -0.066*
Retail markup regulation ≤ 30% (0.034)
Treati × Postt × High markup regulationj -0.055*
Retail markup regulation > 30% (0.028)
Observations 1,115 17,895 17,895
Adjusted R2 0.899 0.897 0.897
Clusters 59 72 72
Store FE yes yes yes
Product variety FE yes yes yes
Month × Product FE yes yes yes
Year-month trend and square yes yes yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable residuals residuals residuals residuals residuals residuals residuals
1th percentile 5th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 95th percentile 99th percentile
Treati × Postt -0.087* -0.067* -0.052** -0.063*** -0.066*** -0.038* -0.032
(0.044) (0.037) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.053)
Observations 56,523 56,523 56,523 56,523 56,523 56,523 56,523
Clusters 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
TABLE 7 - THE IMPACT OF THE LEVEL OF REGULATED MARKUPS
TABLE 8 - THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON RETAIL PRICES (QUANTILE REGRESSIONS)
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the wholesale (column 1) and retail (columns 2 and 3) price of product variety i
and week (retail) or month (wholesale) t. All regressions include binary indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Standard errors
clustered at the product variety level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Notes: The dependent variable is the residuals of a regression of the logarithm of the retail price of product variety i, in store j, and week t on store, product variety, month × product fixed effects and a linear and quadratic
trend measured in months including binary indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Standard errors clustered at the product variety level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
FIGURE A1: THE DISTRIBUTION OF RETAIL PRICES BEFORE AND AFTER DEREGULATION       
(TREATMENT GROUP)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION, REFEREE USE ONLY
FIGURE A2: DYNAMIC RETAIL PRICE RESPONSE TO DEREGULATION
APPENDIX 1
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of residuals in the treatment group one year before ("Before") and one year after the policy change ("After"). The residuals
come from a regression of the logarithm of the retail price of product variety i, in store j, and week t on store, product variety, month × product fixed effects and a
linear and quadratic trend measured in months, and binary indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Sample statistics are reported in the top left corner.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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Notes: Figure A1 plots the regression coefficients from model (2), capturing the dynamic impact of deregulation on the logarithm of retail prices. Each
period corresponds to two weeks. The period denoted by T includes the first two weeks following the policy change. The 95 percent confidence interval
is based on standard errors clustered at the product variety level. Estimated coefficients are reported in Table A4.
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FIGURE A3: DYNAMIC WHOLESALE PRICE RESPONSE TO DEREGULATION
NOT FOR PUBLICATION, REFEREE USE ONLY
Notes: Figure A2 plots the regression coefficients from model (2), capturing the dynamic impact of deregulation on the logarithm of wholesale prices.
Each period corresponds to one month. The period denoted by T includes the first month following the policy change. The 95 percent confidence
interval is based on standard errors clustered at the product variety level. Estimated coefficients are reported in Table A5.
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Product Wholesale 
maximum 
markup
Retail maximum 
markup 
(supermarkets 
and grocery 
stores)
Retail 
maximum 
markup (street 
markets)
Potato 8% 25% 23%
Dry onions 10% 20% 17%
Artichoke, cucumber, tomatoes, strawberry 10% 25% 22%
Zucchini, cauliflower, beetroot, lettuce, 
spinach, cabbage, broccoli, greens, leek, 
peas, carrots, fresh onions, peppers, okra, 
eggplant
10% 30% 27%
Apricot 10% 35% 32%
Peach 10% 35% 30%
Grapes, beans 12% 28% 25%
Bananas 12% 30% 27%
Zucchini, cauliflower, beetroot, lettuce, 
spinach, cabbage, broccoli, greens, leek, 
peas, carrots, fresh onions, peppers, okra, 
eggplant
12% 35% 32%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method Unregulated Regulated p-value Unregulated Regulated p-value
2011 2011 Ha: diff != 0 2006-2011 2006-2011 Ha: diff != 0
Cultivation area (1000 hectares) 9.680 9.042 0.938 11.536 9.725 0.845
(4.407) (3.050) (11.536) (3.437)
Harvested production (1000 tonnes) 266.940 158.828 0.413 260.176 269.697 0.975
(155.196) (45.992) (158.902) (114.702)
Yield (100 kg/hectares) 167.560 211.584 0.512 161.248 207.063 0.506
(26.925) (26.053) (27.385) (25.949)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION, REFEREE USE ONLY
TABLE A2 - TEST OF MEANS FOR REGULATED  AND UNREGULATED PRODUCTS 
TABLE A1- MAXIMUM WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKUPS
Source: Ministerial decision A2-1045 (Gazette B’ 1502/22-6-2011)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis below means. Unregulated group includes: apples, pears, lemons, oranges and mandarins. Regulated group includes products affected by markup 
regulation: apricots, atrichokes, beans, beetroot, berries (exl strawberries), beans, cabbage, carrot, cauliflower, broccoli, celery, cherries, courgettes, cucumbers, eggplants, peas, figs, garlic, leeks, 
lettuces, melons, nectarines, onions, peaches, peas,  plums, potatoes, peppers, spinach, strawberries, sweet lupins, tomatoes, table grapes, watermelons.
Source: EUROSTAT, Crops products - annual data [apro_cpp_crop]
.
Treatment Group Control Group Super Market Control Group
Apricot Apple Beer
Apricot (Diamantopoulou)* Apple (Golden)* Amstel can 6x330
Apricot (common)* Apple (Golden-imported) Kaiser can 6X330
Artichoke Apple (Grand Smith)* Biscuits
Artichoke (common)* Apple (Grand Smith-imported) Pti beur Papadopoulou 225gr
Artichoke (imported) Apple (Starkin)* Brandy
Banana Apple (Starkin-imported) Metaxa 3*  700ml
Beans Lemon Cereals
Bean Barbouni* Lemon (common)*  Kellog's Special K 500gr 
Bean Barbouni (imported) Lemon (imported) Condensed milk
Bean Tsaouli* Mandarins Nounou 410gr
Beetroot Clementin mandarin* Nounou light 170gr
Broccoli Clementin mandarin (imported) Flour
Broccoli (common)* Mandarin (common)* Giotis flour 1kg
Broccoli (imported) Orange Pasteurised milk
Cabbage Valencia orange Delta full fat 3.5%  1lt
Carrot Orange (navalines-merlin)* Nounou family full fat 1lt
Cauliflower Pear Olympos full fat 1lt
Cauliflower (common)* Pear (imported) Chocolate milk Milko
Cauliflower (imported) Pear Krystali* Rice
Cherry Pear Krystali (imported) Carolina 3A 500gr
Cherry (petrokeraso)* Rum
Cherry (crisp)* Bacardi 1lt
Cucumber Spaghetti
Cucumber small* Misko 500gr
Cucumber large* Toast bread
Eggplant Karamolegkos
Tsakonian eggplant* Toast
Eggplant (common)* Friggania papadopoulou 510gr
Eggplant (imported) Whisky
Fresh onion Jonnie Walker red 1lt
Grapes Wine
Grape (common)* Kourtaki retsina
Sultana grapes (raisin)*
Greens
Kiwi
Kiwi (common)*
Kiwi (imported)
Leek
Lettuce
Lettuce (common)*
Lettuce (brown)*
Melon
Melon (common)*
Melon (Argitis)*
Melon (Thrace)*
Nectarine
Okra
Thick okra*
Fine okra*
Onion
Onion (common)*
Onion (imported)
Peach
Peas
Pepper
Pepper (longish)*
Florinis peppers*
Green pepper (large)*
Green pepper  (large-imported)
Potato
Potato (common)*
French potato
Potato (imported)
Potato Cyprus
Spinach
Strawberry
Tomato
Tomato (common)*
Tomato (imported)
Watermelon
Zucchini
Zucchini*
Zucchini (imported)
TABLE A3- PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION
NOT FOR PUBLICATION, REFEREE USE ONLY
Notes: The table reports information on the classification of all the products (and their varieties) used in the estimation. All
products were also covered in the wholesale data. A star (*) indicates the product varieties matched in the wholesale data.
Estimation method FE
Dependent variable ln(Retail Price)ijt
Treati × Postt-10 0.041
(0.029)
Treati × Postt-9 0.004
(0.035)
Treati × Postt-8 0.014
(0.034)
Treati × Postt-7 -0.021
(0.035)
Treati × Postt-6 0.014
(0.036)
Treati × Postt-5 0.076*
(0.038)
Treati × Postt-4 0.005
(0.039)
Treati × Postt-3 0.022
(0.044)
Treati × Postt-2 -0.096**
(0.047)
Treati × Postt-1 -0.079
(0.049)
Treati × Postt -0.064
(0.044)
Treati × Postt+1 -0.004
(0.043)
Treati × Postt+2 -0.070
(0.048)
Treati × Postt+3 -0.119
(0.119)
Treati × Postt+4 -0.021
(0.068)
Treati × Postt+5 -0.130*
(0.068)
Treati × Postt+6 -0.038
(0.056)
Treati × Postt+7 -0.065*
(0.034)
Treati × Postt+8 -0.029
(0.050)
Treati × Postt+9 -0.082**
(0.033)
Treati × Postt+10 -0.067**
(0.028)
Observations 56,523
Adjusted R2 0.861
Clusters 72
Store FE yes
Product variety FE yes
Month x Product FE yes
Year-month trend and square yes
TABLE A4 - DYNAMIC IMPACT OF DEREGULATION 
ON RETAIL PRICES
NOT FOR PUBLICATION, REFEREE USE ONLY
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the retail price of product variety 
i, in store j, and week t. Each period corresponds to two weeks. The period denoted 
by T includes the first two weeks following the policy change. All regressions 
include binary indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Standard errors clustered at 
the product variety level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant 
at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of
Development.
Estimation method FE
Dependent variable ln(Wholesale Price)it
Treati × Postt-5 -0.088
(0.125)
Treati × Postt-4 0.056
(0.121)
Treati × Postt-3 0.198*
(0.118)
Treati × Postt-2 0.168
(0.113)
Treati × Postt-1 0.002
(0.123)
Treati × Postt -0.121
(0.126)
Treati × Postt+1 -0.071
(0.156)
Treati × Postt+2 -0.018
(0.192)
Treati × Postt+3 -0.088
(0.162)
Treati × Postt+4 -0.000
(0.040)
Treati × Postt+5 -0.121**
(0.058)
Observations 764
Adjusted R2 0.936
Clusters 59
Product FE yes
Month x Product FE yes
Year-month trend and square yes
TABLE A5 - DYNAMIC IMPACT OF DEREGULATION ON 
WHOLESALE PRICES
NOT FOR PUBLICATION, REFEREE USE ONLY
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the wholesale price of product 
variety i in month t. Each period corresponds to one month. The period denoted by T 
includes the first month following the policy change. All regressions include binary 
indicators for the changes in VAT rates. Standard errors clustered at the product 
variety level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of
Development.
